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Abstract 
This chapter complements exiting African liberalization literature by providing fresh patterns 
of two main areas. First, it assesses whether African banking institutions have benefited from 
liberalization policies in terms of bank returns. Second, it models bank return and return 
uncertainty in the context of openness policies to examine fresh patterns for the feasibility of 
common policy initiatives. The empirical evidence is based on 28 African countries for the 
period 1999-2010. Varying non-overlapping intervals and autoregressive orders are employed 
for robustness purposes. The findings show that, while trade openness has increased bank 
returns and return uncertainties, financial openness and institutional liberalization have 
decreased bank returns and reduced return uncertainty respectively. But for some scanty 
evidence of convergence in return on equity, there is overwhelming absence of catch-up 
among sampled countries. Implications for regional integration and portfolio diversification 
are discussed.  
JEL Classification: D6; F30; F41; F50; O55 
Keywords: Liberalization policies; Capital return; Africa 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2008 financial crisis was not a shock that was later accompanied by struggles 
from rational actors. Instead, it shows the crucial relevance of social conventions like risk 
management models adopted to cope with uncertainty. The failure of economists and political 
scientists to predict the crisis is both dismal and embarrassing. The crisis has further reminded 
scholars that we live in a world of uncertainty and risk. In a risky world, the hypothesis that 
agents adopt rational, instrumental and consistent decision rules is logical. However when 
parameters are quite unstable to forecast future events, this hypothesis becomes untenable. 
This has prompted policy makers and market players to depend on certain social conventions 
that render uncertain environments stable (Nelson & Katzenstein, 2011).  
With the recent financial crisis, the appealing ambitions of globalization policies and 
their implications for development have been questioned, with more emphasis placed on 
developing countries. According to some policy makers, the crisis has substantially exposed 
the drawbacks of liberalization policies (Kose et al., 2006; Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014a). 
This is essentially because emerging markets which experienced substantial inflows of capital 
over the last decade have been faced with the daunting task of managing macroeconomic 
shocks resulting from a considerable decline in the same flows. Owing to the theoretical 
motivations of financial globalization, the economic downturn has unraveled the debate on the 
effects of globalization in developing countries
2
.  
In the 1980s when the current trend of globalization began, developed and developing 
countries experienced rising cross-border financial flows. The surges in financial transactions 
were followed by a spade of currency crises. These developments reignited the debated 
                                                 
2
 According to theoretical postulations, financial globalization is expected to promote international risk sharing 
and ease the efficient international allocation of capital. Developing countries should reap higher rewards 
because they are relatively labor rich and capital scarce. In addition, developing countries are more volatile in 
terms of output than their industrial counterparts which increases investment, growth and the potential welfare 
gains resulting from international risk sharing (Asongu, 2013a, b; Kose et al., 2011).  
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among scholars over the benefits of openness, with some affirming that developing countries 
which opened their capital accounts have been more adversely affected and increasingly 
vulnerable to the shocks than  their industrial counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 2007; 
Asongu, 2014a). Among items of the debate, whereas the concern about the positive rewards 
for trade openness have reached a consensus (Kose et al., 2006), the incidence of financial 
openness has intensified with more polarization (Asongu, 2014a).  
The wave of structural and policy adjustments that began in most African countries in 
the 1980s can be classified into two main strands: first generation and second generation 
reforms (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992; Batuo & Asongu, 2014a). Adopted policy initiatives in the 
first generation of reforms entailed: the abolishment of explicit control on allocation of credit 
and pricing, reduction of direct government intervention decisions, allowance of credit to be 
determined by market forces and, relaxation of control over international financial flows. 
Second generation reforms that focused on institutional and structural constraints included, 
inter alia: restoration of bank soundness, financial infrastructure rehabilitation and 
amelioration of the institutional, regulatory, legal and supervisor environments (Batuo et al., 
2010; Asongu, 2013a).  
Unfortunately, in spite of over two decades of reforms, African banks are still 
substantially suffering from surplus liquidity issues that affect profits and returns (Saxegaard, 
2006; Fouda, 2009; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Asongu, 2012a; 2013c, 2014bc; Nguena, 
2014).  Three natural concerns arise from the bulk of empirical evidence above. (1) The 
temptation of inquiring whether African financial institutions have in fact benefited from the 
liberalization policies in terms of bank returns. (2) Owing to the uncertainty of the global 
financial environment, an analogue concern is how the liberalization policies have affected 
uncertainty in bank returns.  (3) The issue of patterns on which common policies on bank 
return and return uncertainty can be adopted. While a great chunk of the literature has focused 
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on the incidence of reforms on financial development (Cho et al., 1986; Ndikumana, 1999; 
2000, 2005; Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Asongu, 2012a;  Kose et al., 2006; 
Al-Obaidan, 2008; Kiyato, 2009; Kablan, 2010; Kukenova, 2011), as far as we have reviewed 
there is yet no study has the investigated the second and third concerns above.  
Against this background, the present chapter steers clear of past studies in three 
perspectives: effect of liberalization policies on bank return uncertainty; feasibility of 
common policies for bank return and return uncertainties and; usage of updated data for more 
focused or fresh policies implications. First, given the recent debate on the lofty ambitions of 
globalization policies (due to the recent financial crises), we assess the effects of liberalization 
policies on return uncertainty. The assessment is important because, financial crises are 
characterized by high uncertainties in return and hence, policy makers should be as much 
concerned about profitability as uncertainty in profitability. Second, the adoption of common 
policy initiatives is feasible when there is some form of convergence in bank return or return 
uncertainty. This intuition has theoretical underpinnings in income convergence that has been 
substantially documented in catch-up literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; 
Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro  & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995). Third, the use of very 
recent data enables us to provide results with updated policy implications. Accordingly, the 
periodicity (1999-2010) is intended to capture second generation reforms for fresh policy 
implications.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
highlights and a brief literature. Data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.  
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2. Brief literature and theoretical highlights  
 
2.1 Allocation efficiency, bank return and uncertainty  
 
 The decision to adopt liberalization and achieve the benefits of international risk 
sharing, bank return and efficient financial resource allocation has been subject to a lot of 
heated debate in academic and policy making circles. Consistent with Asongu (2013b, 2014a), 
there are two strands in the literature on the interest of liberalization as a policy initiative for 
African countries in their objective to achieve efficient allocation of resources and bank 
returns.   
 The first strand relies on the theoretical underpinnings of the seminal work of Solow 
(1956) on the rewards of allocation efficiency and bank return. According to the neoclassical 
growth model, liberalization has a lot of positive effects, especially in terms of efficiency and 
profitability. In essence, there is a flow of resources from developed countries that are capital 
abundant with low capital return to developing countries with high return in capital. Many 
developing countries have liberalized their economies with the objective of reaping the 
benefits discussed above. They have been motivated by the arguments that the movement of 
capital from resource-abundant to resource-poor countries mitigates the cost of capital, raises 
return to investment and economic prosperity that ultimately improve living standards 
(Obstfeld, 1998; Fischer, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 2000; Asongu, 2013ab, 2014a). 
 On the other hand, the benefits highlighted above are viewed in the second strand as a 
fanciful attempt to extend the benefits of international trade in goods to assets. According to 
the strand, the appealing sides above find any substance only when economies do not suffer 
from distortions apart from the undisturbed flow of capital resources. Hence, in light of the 
distortions arising from the recent financial crisis, the second strand sustains that the 
theoretical predictions of liberalization policies from the neoclassical growth model are 
unrealistic.  Before the beginning of the century and a decade later, Rodrik (1998) and Rodrik 
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& Subramanian (2009) supported this strand: respectively writing papers with provocative 
titles like “Who Needs Capital Account Convertibility” and “Why did financial globalization 
disappoint?” (Asongu,  2013b). From a broad standpoint, the authors sustain that there seems 
to be no real correlation between the amount invested in (or the growth rate of an economy) 
and capital account openness.  In line with this narrative, the rewards of financial openness 
are not really visible. However the consistent reoccurrence of crises have evidently confirmed 
the costs (Rodrik, 1998). Rodrik & Subramanian (2009) have emphasized that in the wake of 
the recent global financial crisis, the thesis that financial engineering has brought about the 
gains discussed in the first strand sound less plausible. They have argued that financial 
liberalization has failed to improve growth and investment in developing countries.  
According to them, countries that have witnessed substantial economic prosperity have been 
those that are less reliant on capital inflows. In their view, globalization has not reduced 
volatility and smoothened consumption. Asongu (2013b, 2014a) has joined in hypothesizing 
that the benefits of liberalization are speculative, indirect and unpersuasive. This further 
reflects the uncertain dimension of bank returns in developing countries.  
 We devote space to briefly discussing risk transfer and insurance. Consistent with 
Cummins & Weiss (2009, p. 493), over the past decade, a strand of the economic 
development literature has focused on the assessment of convergence in the financial market 
industry, especially in reinsurance sectors and capital markets. According to the narrative, 
convergence has been facilitated by a plethora of factors: the emergence of enterprise risk 
management, increase in the severity and frequency of catastrophic risks, advances in 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), (re) insurance underwriting cycles due 
to market inefficiencies, inter alia. In this vein, hybrid financial/insurance instruments have 
resulted from the developments. The literature on development and evolution of instruments, 
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institutions and risk-transfer markets can be summarized in three main strands: market 
inception period, market evolutionary period and market take-off period. 
 First, on the market inception period, scholarly focus on insurance securities and 
reinsurance-financial products has been quite recent. According Cummins & Weiss, it was 
triggered by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the later the introduction of options and insurance 
futures. The interesting literature from D’Arcy & France (1992), Cox & Schwebach (1992) 
and Niehaus & Mann (1992) has covered much territory on this strand.  However, this early 
literature left most of the identified issues unsolved. Such include, inter alia: trade-off 
between basis risk and moral hazard, magnitude of risk premia, counterparty credit risk and 
insurer acceptance of new contracts. Second, the market evolution period which 
approximately varies from 1994 to 2004 is the tolerance during which the market tried 
different capital instruments. While a plethora of financial instruments are tried during this 
span, a substantial number of them are unsuccessful. Third, the market take-off period spans 
from expansion of the market for Cat bonds. An exhaustive literature review on the 
development and evolution of instruments, institutions and risk-transfer markets is 
documented by Cummins & Weiss (2009). 
 
2.2 Theoretical highlights and intuition  
 
 The concept of catch-up sprouted from the demise of Keynesianism and the rise of the 
neoclassical revolution in which new theories of economic prosperity predicted absolute 
convergence as an extension of market equilibrium or policies of free market competition 
(Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014d). According to the neoclassical growth model, 
convergence occurs to each country’s long-term equilibrium or to a country’s steady state. On 
the other hand, another strand of the literature postulates that it is not feasible for income-
convergence to occur for two principal reasons: differences in initial endowments between 
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countries and the possibility of multiple equilibria. In the latter stance, divergence in initial 
income studies (Barro, 1991) has been confirmed in the long-run (Pritchett, 1997). 
 As we have highlighted above, the empirical strategy is in accordance with the 
substantial bulk of literature that has focused on cross-country income catch-up (Solow, 1956; 
Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro  & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 
1995; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013d, 2014d). While this underlying theory has not yet 
met some consensus, there is currently a growing body of studies using the theoretical 
underpinnings of catch-up literature in many other development fields. According to this 
narrative, scholarly reporting of facts is a useful scientific activity even without some formal 
theoretical underpinning. In this light, we join the strand in asserting that ‘applied 
econometrics’ has other tasks than merely validating or refuting economic theories (Costantini 
& Lupi, 2005; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013d).  
 Putting the theoretical underpinnings into context, we postulate that the presence of 
catch-up among African countries (in terms of return and return uncertainty) means some 
common policies to mitigate the effects of globalization are feasible. On the other hand, full 
catch-up implies that such feasible policies can be implemented without distinction of locality 
or nationality within sampled countries. This is because in such a scenario where convergence 
does not occur, investor can gain by holding portfolios originating from different countries. In 
this light, to the degree that convergence occurs, the benefits from international portfolio 
diversification are mitigated. Hence, a direct consequence of full convergence is that there are 
similar yields for financial assets of similar liquidity and risk, regardless of locality and 
nationality. This intuition is in accordance with an interesting bulk of recent literature on the 
modeling and timing of intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization against software 
piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu, 2013d); common initiatives against African capital 
flight (Asongu, 2014g); the future of knowledge economy (Asongu, 2013g,h);  health of 
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financial markets (Bruno et al., 2012; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013e, 2014e) and 
currency areas (Asongu, 2013f, 2014f), inter alia.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We examine a panel of 28 African countries with annual data from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD)  of the World Bank for the period 1999 to 2010. There is a fourfold justification for 
this periodicity: (1) variables on institutional liberalization are only available from 1996; (2) 
the interest of capturing second generation reforms for fresh policies discussed in the 
introduction; (3) data availability constraints in bank returns and; (4) the computation of 
uncertainty in returns that is accompanied with losses in degrees of freedom.  
The dependent variables are: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
uncertainty in ROA (UROA) and uncertainty in ROE (UROE). The computation of return 
uncertainties is discussed in Section 3.2.1 below. The main independent variables include: 
trade, financial and institutional liberalization measures. These respectively are trade 
openness, foreign direct investment (FDI) and institutional quality index. The institutional 
index obtained from principal component analysis (PCA) is discussed in Section 3.2.2. We 
also control for other macroeconomic and structural characteristics, notably: inflation, 
government expenditure and economic prosperity. Inflation can decrease bank returns (if not 
well incorporated into interest rates) and increase uncertainty in the returns. Government 
expenditure should intuitively have some effect on the dependent variables though the 
expected sign remains ambiguous. We expect economic prosperity to increase bank returns as 
well as uncertainty in these returns. The expected signs for inflation and economic prosperity 
are consistent with Asongu (2011).  
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The intuition for the choice of the control variables is based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of conditional convergence. Accordingly, it is possible for conditional 
convergence to take place when countries differ in macroeconomic and structural 
characteristics that determine bank return and return uncertainty. Consistent with Asongu 
(2013b, 2014a), we control for globalization in terms of trade, financial and institutional 
liberalization with trade openness, foreign direct investment, and the institutional 
liberalization index respectively. From intuition and common sense, bank return naturally 
depends on inflation and economic prosperity (GDP growth). We also control for government 
intervention in the economy with government’s final consumption expenditure (Norden et al., 
2012).  
The definition of variables (and their corresponding sources), presentation of the 
sampled countries (with the summary statistics) and correlation analysis are detailed in 
Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. While Appendix 2 shows that there is 
quite some variation in the data employed such that reasonable estimated linkages could 
emerge, Appendix 3 serves to control for potential issues of overparametization and 
multicollinearity that could substantially bias estimated coefficients.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Computing return uncertainty  
 When agents are faced with uncertainty, conditional proxies for volatility are better 
measures (Kangoye, 2013). Accordingly, GARCH-based approaches are appropriate to model 
uncertainty. The variance of return contingent on past information is specified by a GARCH 
(p,q) model. Unfortunately, GARCH-based approaches have a better fit with high frequency 
data. Since, we are employing annual data; we use first- and second-order autoregressive 
processes of the return variables. The uncertainties in the returns are then proxied by the 
standard deviation of the corresponding residuals. In the computation of the standard errors 
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(uncertainties) we used three-year and four-year non-overlapping intervals for first-order and 
second-order autoregressive processes respectively.  
 
3.2.2 Principal component analysis (PCA) 
Consistent with Asongu (2013b), the high degree of substitution (correlation) among 
government quality variables means some information will be redundant if all the indicators 
were considered simultaneously. Thus we employ PCA to reduce the dimensions and retain 
only common factors that reflect much of the information or variability in the initial dataset. 
PCA has been substantially used to reduce a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller 
set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs). The criteria  used to retain 
the common factors is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) who have recommended that 
only PCs with an eigenvalue of more than one should be retained. Hence, from Table 1, it can 
be noticed that the first PC represents more than 78% of common information and has an 
eigenvalue of 4.70. We call this composite indicator the institutional index (instidex).  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Institutional Index (Instidex) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 V & A R.L R.Q G.E PS CC    
First  P.C 0.369 0.435 0.412 0.425 0.388 0.416 0.784 0.784 4.705 
Second  P.C -0.690 0.103 0.258 0.436 -0.453 0.227 0.083 0.867 0.499 
Third P.C 0.591 -0.187 0.299 0.051 -0.724 -0.002 0.054 0.922 0.327 
P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. 
 
 
3.2.3 Model specification and estimation technique 
 
 As documented in recent literature (Asongu, 2014d) from Islam (2003), there are a 
plethora of ways to understand and apply the concept of convergence: convergence across 
economies versus (vs) convergence within an economy; convergence in terms of income vs. 
convergence in terms of growth rate; sigma-convergence vs. beta-convergence; conditional 
convergence vs. unconditional (absolute) convergence; local or club-convergence vs. global-
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convergence; TFP (total factor productivity)-convergence vs. income-convergence and; 
stochastic convergence vs. deterministic-convergence.  
 Some matches between the definitions of convergence and methodologies employed 
have also been documented. These matches are not unique because beta-convergence has 
either conditionally or unconditionally been assessed with a plethora of approaches: time 
series, panel-based as well as formal and informal cross-sectional approaches. Most of the 
documented techniques have been positioned on per capita income across countries. In 
addition, the panel-focused strategy and cross-sectional techniques have also been employed 
to investigate TFP and club convergences. While the cross-sectional strategy has even been 
used for sigma-convergence, the time-series technique has been employed to investigate 
catch-up within and across countries. The distribution technique has investigated beyond 
sigma-convergence by assessing the whole shape of intra-distribution and dynamics of 
distributions.  
 In line with Asongu (2014d), the beta-convergence approach is in line with growth 
rate and income-level investigations. It originates from the hypothesis of decreasing returns 
representing a greater capital marginal productivity in capital-poor countries. According to the 
intuition, with comparable savings rates, less developed countries would experience higher 
levels in economic prosperity. Under this scenario, there is a negative nexus between the 
initial level of income and the subsequent growth rate. Beta catch-up is used to qualify this 
form of convergence. However, a draw-back to this technique is that a non-positive beta 
coefficient from the initial growth level may not necessarily imply diminishing dispersion. 
The downside has resulted in the concept of sigma-convergence, in which sigma denotes the 
standard deviation of cross-sectional distributions. In spite of this drawback emphasizing that 
beta-convergence is not a sufficient but a necessary condition for sigma-convergence, 
researchers have continuously employed it because it conveys information on structural 
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parameters of growth models. Accordingly, such information is not usually provided by the 
distribution technique.  
 As discussed in the ‘theoretical highlights and intuition for the empirics’ section 
above, this beta(β)-convergence estimation strategy is broadly in line with a recent strand of a 
methodological innovation in the investigation of catch-up.  According to the narrative, the 
following two equations are the standard processes for assessing beta-convergence (Fung, 
2009; Asongu, 2013d). Eq. (1) is plausible if tiW ,  is strictly exogenous.  
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(              (1) 
 
tititititi WYaY ,,,, )ln()ln(                           (2) 
 
Where a = 1+ β, tiY ,  is the measure of bank return or corresponding uncertainty in country i at 
period t.  tiW ,  is a vector of determinants of the dependent variables,  i  is a country-specific 
effect,  t  is a time- specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. According to the neoclassical 
growth model, when the estimated beta coefficient in Eq (1) is statistically and negatively 
significant, it implies that countries  relatively near their steady state in bank returns will 
experience a slowdown in the progress of return (and their corresponding uncertainty) known 
as conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, p. 2773). On the other hands, if   
10  a in Eq. (2), then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable around the path with a trend growth rate 
similar to that of  tW , and with a height relative to the level of tW  (Fung, 2009, p. 59).  The 
individual effect i  and variables contained in tiW ,   are proxies for the long-run level returns 
in the financial intermediation market are converging to. The former measures characteristics 
affecting the country’s steady state that are not reflected by tiW , . 
 The criteria for convergence discussed above are satisfied only when tiW ,  is strictly 
exogenous. Unfortunately in the real world, this is a subject to controversy due to the inherent 
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possibility of reverse-causality. In essence, while liberalization policies could affect bank 
returns and their corresponding uncertainties, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out because 
the state of domestic financial institutions also influences openness policies adopted by a 
country. A means of tackling the concern of endogeneity consists of eliminating the country-
specific effects by first differencing. Therefore, Eq (2) becomes: 
)()()())ln()(ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,,     tititttitititititi WWYYaYY       (3)  
 
 We further use the Arellano & Bond (1991) method or the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) that exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the error term and the 
lagged dependent variables. This is essentially because, even after first differencing to 
eliminate the country-specific effect, there is still some correlation between the error term and 
the lagged endogenous variable. Consistent with the underpinning empirical literature 
(Asongu, 2013d), we are concur with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4)
3
 in preferring the System 
GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the Difference GMM 
estimation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). It is a combination of Eqs (2) and (3) which has been 
substantially employed in recently documented catch-up literature. We specify a two-step 
GMM instead of a one-step because it is heteroscedascity-consistent. The Arellano & Bond 
autocorrelation and Sargan overidentifying (OIR) tests are used to assess the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals and validity of the instruments respectively.  
 The empirics of catch-up have consistently sustained that yearly times are too short to 
be appropriate for investigating convergence because short-run disturbances may loom 
substantially in such brief time spans (Islam, 1995, p. 323). Hence, given the 11 years period 
                                                 
3
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our 
empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent 
empirical growth research”. Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4).  
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(1999-2010) we use three-year and four-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI)
4
. We cannot 
use two-year NOI because of constraints in computing the standard errors (standard deviation 
of the residuals). On the other hand, we cannot employ more than four-year non-overlapping 
intervals due to constraints in degrees of freedom required for conditional convergence 
modeling. In essence, higher NOI orders have an inverse relationship with degrees of 
freedom.  
 We compute the implied rate of convergence by computing a/3 and a/4 respectively 
for the three-year and four-year NOI because we have used 3 and 4 years to mitigate short-run 
disturbances. The criterion employed to assess the existence of convergence is : 10  a . It 
implies convergence occurs when the absolute value of the estimated lagged return variable is 
less than one but greater than zero. In other words, past variations have a less proportionate 
impact on future differences, implying the difference on the left hand side of Eq. (3) is 
diminishing overtime or the country is moving to a steady state (Prochniak & Witkowski, 
2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; Asongu, 2014d, p. 10).  
 Before presenting the results, it is interesting to briefly discuss the economic intuitions 
motivating the assessments of absolute and conditional convergence in bank return. 
Consistent with Asongu (2013e), absolute convergence in market return occurs when 
countries share the same fundamental characteristics in relation to bank return such that only 
differences in initial levels of bank return exist. Hence, this form of convergence is the result 
of factors like the adoption of a unique currency, creation of monetary unions, inter alia. 
Absolute convergence could also take place due to adjustments that are common to many 
nations. For example, as highlighted in the introduction, many African countries engaged in a 
plethora of structural and institutional reforms from the 1980s under the umbrella of Bretton 
                                                 
4
 There are four three-year NOI: 1999-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007 & 2008-2010. We also have three four-year 
NOI: 1999-2002; 2003-2006 & 2007-2010.  
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Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank for instance). The 
implemented reforms included liberalization policies with the objective to mitigate barriers to 
investment and trade. These reforms have been given credit for the impressive performance of 
the financial intermediary markets in Africa, essentially because they theoretically obviate the 
preferences for specific markets by investors. Other factors that could facilitate absolute 
convergence are the improvements in ICTs that have ameliorated synchronization in the 
financial intermediary market such that, cross-market shock adjustments are much faster. In 
this logic, the speed at which cross-market shocks occur has increased with ICT growth and 
hence, eased absolute convergence.  
 Conversely, as we have already highlighted in the third paragraph of Section 3.1, 
conditional convergence is the type of catch-up which is contingent on institutional and 
structural characteristics. Hence, in line with theoretical underpinnings, this form of 
convergence is one in which a country’s long-term equilibrium (or steady state) is conditional 
on fundamentals of the market/economy and structural characteristics (Narayan et al., 2011). 
Hence, this form is conditioned on the macroeconomic (institutional and structural) variables 
we choose and empirically test.  
 
4. Empirical analysis  
4.1 Presentation of results 
 This section assesses three main issues underlying the motivation of the chapter: (1) 
examining catch-up in returns and return uncertainties, (2) computing the rate of catch-up and, 
(3) investigating the time needed for full (100%) convergence. While tackling the first-two 
concerns informs us on the feasibility of common policies in bank return and uncertainties, 
the third concern provides the timeline during which such common policy initiatives can be 
implemented without distinction of locality or nationality.   
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 Table 2 below summarizes the results presented in Table 3. Absolute (or 
unconditional) convergence is computed with only the lagged value of the dependent variable 
as independent variable whereas, conditional convergence is modeled with the vector of 
determinants ( tiW , ). In order to assess the validity of the estimations and indeed the 
convergence hypotheses, we perform two tests.  First, the Arellano and Bond test for 
autocorrelation which examines the null hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation. Second, 
the Sargan test that investigates the overidentification restrictions. We also report the Wald 
test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. The models are overwhelmingly valid 
because for the most part:  (1) the null hypotheses for the Sargan and autocorrelation tests are 
not rejected and; (2) the null hypothesis of the Wald test is rejected in the presence of 
significant coefficients. For some models, the autocorrelation test is not reported because of 
issues in degrees of freedom.  
 We also devote some space to discussing the computation of the values in Table 2: 
rate of catch-up and time for full (100%) catch-up. Given an initial value of 0.903 that is 
significant with valid instruments and no autocorrelation in the residuals: (1) the catch-up rate 
is 30.10% ((0.903/3)*100) and; (2) the length of time required for full catch-up is 9.96 years 
(300%/30.10%). Therefore, 9 years (yrs) and about 350 days are needed to achieve 100% 
catch-up for a lagged value of 0.903 that is in accordance with the information criterion: 
10  a . 
 The findings in Table 2 reflect only scanty evidence of convergence in ROE for the 
three-year NOI (Panel A). The rate is 30.10% for absolute convergence (AC) and 26.23% for 
conditional convergence (CC) with corresponding timelines to full convergence of 9.96 years 
(yrs) and 11.43 years respectively. There is no evidence of catch-up in return uncertainties 
(Panel B).  
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Table 2: Summary of the results  
  
 Panel A: Returns 
 Absolute Convergence Conditional Convergence 
 Three-Year NOI Four-Year NOI Three-Year NOI Four-Year NOI 
 ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Convergence? No Yes No No No Yes No No 
Rate of Convergence  n.a 30.10% n.a n.a n.a 26.23% n.a n.a 
Time to Full Convergence n.a 9.96Yrs n.a n.a n.a 11.43Yrs n.a n.a 
         
         
 Panel B: Uncertainty in Returns 
 Absolute Convergence Conditional Convergence 
 AR(1) &Three-Year 
NOI 
AR(2) & Four-
Year NOI 
AR(1) &Three-Year 
NOI 
AR(2) & Four-Year 
NOI 
 UROA UROE UROA UROE UROA UROE UROA UROE 
         
Convergence? No No No No No No No No 
Rate of Convergence  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Time to Full Convergence n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
         
ROA: Return on Assets. ROE: Return on Equity. UROA: Uncertainty in ROA. UROE: Uncertainty in ROE. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. 
Trade: Trade Openness. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPg: Gross Domestic Growth rate. Instidex: Institutional Index. NOI: Non-
Overlapping Intervals. n.a: not applicable due to the absence of convergence. Yrs: years.  AR(1): First Order Autoregression. AR(2): Second 
Order Autoregression. Autoregression is on the Return variables (ROA & ROE).  
 
 Most of the significant control variables in Table 3 have the expected signs. (1) While 
the benefits in terms of bank return and allocation efficiency from trade liberalization are 
apparent, those of financial openness are negative. This is consistent with the substantial bulk 
of documented evidence discussed in the introduction (Kose et al., 2006; Kose et al., 2011; 
Asongu, 2012a, 2014a). (2) Inflation could improve bank return when interest rates are 
adjusted for expected price increases. (3) Economic prosperity implies banks are making 
some profits since they are increasingly lending-out to economic agents. (4) The presence of 
good institutions should mitigate uncertainties since government quality has been established 
to positively affect the performance of African financial markets ( Asongu, 2012b).  
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Table 3: Two-step System GMM for Returns and Return Uncertainty 
         
 Panel A: Returns 
 Absolute Convergence Conditional Convergence 
 Three-Year NOI Four-Year NOI Three-Year NOI Four-Year NOI 
 ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Initial  1.074** 0.903* 1.959** 0.770 0.359 0.787** 0.201 -0.447 
 (0.021) (0.054) (0.012) (0.433) (0.163) (0.030) (0.617) (0.560) 
Constant --- --- --- --- -0.389 -14.099 0.105 21.147 
     (0.575) (0.206) (0.847) (0.299) 
FDI --- --- --- --- -0.049 -0.777* -0.046 1.051 
     (0.356) (0.060) (0.557) (0.687) 
Trade  --- --- --- --- 0.007 0.136** 0.005 -0.036 
     (0.232) (0.019) (0.338) (0.823) 
Inflation --- --- --- --- 0.030 -0.039 0.063** 0.499 
     (0.364) (0.891) (0.045) (0.599) 
Gov. Exp. --- --- --- --- 0.032* 0.338** 0.0008 -0.002 
     (0.091) (0.018) (0.972) (0.996) 
GDPg --- --- --- --- 0.184*** 2.236*** 0.143* 0.933 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.066) (0.674) 
Instidex --- --- --- --- -0.003 -0.571 0.012 1.663 
     (0.967) (0.212) (0.874) (0.507) 
         
Auto -1.149 -1.110 n.a n.a -1.153 -1.089 n.a n.a  
 (0.250) (0.266)   (0.248) (0.276)   
Sargan OIR 2.829 3.462 0.222 2.413 1.668 1.682 0.105 0.611 
 (0.586) (0.483) (0.637) (0.120) (0.796) (0.794) (0.745) (0.434) 
Wald 5.267** 3.688* 6.306** 0.613 145.39*** 70.374*** 130.46*** 5.972 
 (0.021) (0.054) (0.012) (0.433) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.543) 
Countries  28 28 28 28 18 18 15 15 
Observations 84 84 56 56 49 49 30 30 
         
 Panel B: Uncertainty in Returns 
 Absolute Convergence Conditional Convergence 
 AR(1) &Three-Year NOI AR(2) & Four-Year NOI AR(1) &Three-Year NOI AR(2) & Four-Year NOI 
 UROA UROE UROA UROE UROA UROE UROA UROE 
         
Initial 0.074 0.231 -0.555 -0.051 0.082 0.252 0.177 -0.418 
 (0.596) (0.127) (0.341) (0.883) (0.631) (0.295) (0.357) (0.484) 
Constant --- --- --- --- 0.240 2.118 -0.238 -2.878 
     (0.659) (0.674) (0.268) (0.401) 
FDI --- --- --- --- -0.014 0.204 0.012 0.157 
     (0.669) (0.684) (0.747) (0.768) 
Trade  --- --- --- --- 0.003 0.006 0.004* 0.061 
     (0.501) (0.897) (0.098) (0.284) 
Inflation --- --- --- --- 0.001 -0.025 0.012 0.031 
     (0.914) (0.876) (0.407) (0.889) 
Gov. Exp. --- --- --- --- 0.017* 0.143 0.014 0.226 
     (0.083) (0.222) (0.212) (0.164) 
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.018 0.033 0.031 0.864 
     (0.773) (0.960) (0.372) (0.115) 
Instidex --- --- --- --- -0.020 0.150 -0.025* 0.104 
     (0.518) (0.645) (0.075) (0.814) 
         
Auto -0.329 -1.515 n.a  n.a -1.306 -1.085 n.a n.a 
 (0.741) (0.129)   (0.191) (0.277)   
Sargan OIR 3.467 3.312 0.051 0.096 5.560 4.807 2.045 3.664* 
 (0.482) (0.506) (0.820) (0.755) (0.234) (0.307) (0.152) (0.055) 
Wald 0.280 2.318 0.903 0.021 18.211** 28.82*** 88.99*** 14.434** 
 (0.596) (0.127) (0.341) (0.883) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) 
Countries  26 26 26 26 18 18 15 15 
Observations 78 78 52 52 49 49 30 30 
         
ROA: Return on Assets. ROE: Return on Equity. UROA: Uncertainty in ROA. UROE: Uncertainty in ROE. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. 
Trade: Trade Openness. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPg: Gross Domestic Growth rate. Instidex: Institutional Index. *,**,**: 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Initial: Lagged dependent variable.  Auto: Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the Auto tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
P-values in brackets.  AR(1): First Order Autoregression. AR(2): Second Order Autoregression. Autoregression is on the Return variables.  
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4.2 Discussion of results, policy implications and caveats  
 
4.2.1 Discussion of results 
 The absence of absolute convergence (AC) implies that there are substantial 
differences in initial levels (endowments) of return and return uncertainty. On the other hand, 
the presence of AC in ROE means that beyond the possibility of dissimilar initial conditions, 
there are some common factors (without the control of the sampled countries) that are 
enabling countries with low-levels in ROE to catch-up their counterparts with higher levels. 
On the other hand, dissimilarity in initial ROE levels is influenced by various factors such as 
leverage and capital requirements, inter alia. It is interesting to understand that AC is 
principally the end of common factors, among others: the adoption of monetary unions like 
single currency areas.  
 On the other hand, the presence of conditional convergence (CC) in ROE further 
implies that there are substantial differences among countries in factors that determine ROE. 
It should also be noted that this form of catch-up is contingent on the variables we choose and 
empirically test which may not reflect all the determinants of ROE. We have used six control 
variables in the conditioning information set. Liberalization (trade, capital and institutional) 
and three other macroeconomic characteristics (inflation, government expenditure and 
economic prosperity) have constituted the conditioning information set. However, we could 
not constraint the conditional assessment beyond these control variables due to issues in 
degrees of freedom.  Accordingly, some models in the literature are not conditioned beyond 
two macroeconomic variables (Bruno et al., 2012).  
 
 4.2.2 Policy implications  
 
4.2.2.1 Implications for regional integration   
  
 Consistent with Asongu (2013e), the findings are relevant in terms of regional 
integration. The overwhelming absence of catch-up could indicate the existence of non-
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homogenous financial intermediation markets. Hence, policy makers should reconsider 
adopted measures to achieve a higher degree of catch-up in the African banking market. This 
invites the question of if policies implemented this far by the sampled countries to promote 
financial integration have yielded the desired effects. Within the framework of bank returns 
and return expectations, the convergence patterns indicate that such effects are not noticeable. 
Whereas from an economic perspective, integration is taking place, it is not yet evident with 
respect to the dependent variables used in this chapter. While it would be premature to 
conclude that efforts furnished at integrating the African intermediary financial market have 
been largely futile, it is nonetheless tempting to infer that geographical proximity is necessary 
but not sufficient for integration. 
  
4. 2.2.2 Implications for portfolio diversification 
 
 As Asongu (2013e) has emphasized that, the absence of strong nexuses among African 
markets provides opportunities for portfolio diversification. Since our findings 
overwhelmingly support the absence of convergence, a practical implication for investors in 
the African continent is that holding portfolios in different countries will be profitable. Hence, 
to the extent that convergence in the banking industry takes place, the rewards from 
international portfolio diversification will be mitigated. The countervailing perspective 
sustains that certain nations retain their country-specific financial and economic 
characteristics which will inhibit the financial intermediary market from full convergence 
(Adler & Dumas, 1983). In other words, from an African context the tendencies for home 
bias, impediments to the free flow of capital, (inter alia) will preserve the benefits from 
international diversification. The absence of catch-up further means that there is no possibility 
of similar yields for financial assets of similar liquidity and risk, regardless of locality and 
nationality. In this context, portfolio diversification will benefit investors.  
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 Accordingly, financial intermediation theories consider integrated markets to be more 
efficient relative to divergent ones. This is essentially because markets that are integrated 
stimulate the flow of funds across borders and increase liquidity after improving the volume 
of trade. In essence, due to the lower transaction cost for investors and lower cost of capital 
for firms (Kim et al., 2005), integrated banking markets provide investors with the 
opportunity of allocating capital efficiently. Integrated financial intermediary markets have 
the appealing rewards to financial stability since they mitigate the possibility of asymmetric 
shocks (Umutlu et al., 2010). 
 The need for convergence in the banking industry could also be explained by the level 
of arbitrage activity. Hence, when markets are converging, the implication is that common 
forces contained in arbitrage activity attract markets together. A further implication is that the 
potential for international diversification and above-normal profits is limited because 
supernormal profits are arbitraged away (Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989).  
 In the same light, when potential walls or barriers generating exchange rate premiums 
and country risks are absent, the direct consequence is similar yields for financial assets of 
similar liquidity and risk regardless of locality and nationality (Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 
1989). In summary, the need for convergence in the African financial intermediary industry 
has basis in arbitrage and the hypotheses underpinning portfolio theory. Hence, the 
motivations for catch-up in the banking sector has basis in the literature of portfolio 
diversification and stock market interdependence (Grubel, 1968; Levy & Sarnat, 1970).  
 
4.2.2.3 Other implications  
It is worthwhile discussing how convergence can be facilitated. As sustained by 
Alagidede (2008) and Asongu (2013e), it could be improved by deregulation and elimination 
of restrictions on banking and securities dealings, amelioration of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), relaxation of controls on capital movements and foreign 
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exchange transactions, inter  alia. Cummins & Weiss (2009) have recommended the following 
drivers of financial market convergence. First, major wheels of financial convergence which 
mainly reflect market imperfections are various accounting, regulatory, tax and rating agency 
factors (RATs). Second, favoring conditions and circumstances for the reinsurance 
underwriting cycle. Third, advances in ICTs. Fourth, developing holistic or enterprise-wide 
risk management (ERM) in which traditionally separated functions like the management of 
insurable risks, currency risks, commodity risks, interest rate risks and other risks start to 
merge under a single risk-management umbrella. 
 
4.2.3 Caveats 
 Three main caveats have been retained from the study. First, while return on assets 
could easily be understood as a measure of bank returns, return on equity may not be a safe 
measure because it is influenced by various factors such as capital requirements, leverage, 
inter alia. Second, there are risks involved when econometrics is employed beyond testing 
theory. However, we have already provided a solid basis for the empirics in the motivation of 
the chapter.  Moreover, conditional convergence is based on the variables we choice and 
empirically test, which may not directly reflect cross-country institutional and structural 
differences that could drive bank return and return uncertainty. Third, the possibility of 
multiple equilibria and initial endowments may limit the feasibility of convergence (Miller & 
Upadhyay, 2002; Apergis et al., 2008;  Caporale et al., 2009; Asongu, 2013e).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 The recent financial crisis has brought about renewed interest in the debate over the 
lofty ambitions of globalization and its implications for financial development, with greater 
intensity in developing countries. This chapter has complemented exiting African 
liberalization literature by providing fresh nexuses and patterns in two main areas. First, it has 
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assessed whether African financial institutions have benefited from liberalization policies in 
terms of bank returns. Results from this investigation have shown that, while trade openness 
has increased bank returns and return uncertainties, financial openness and institutional 
liberalization have decreased bank returns and reduced return uncertainty respectively. 
Second, we have modeled bank returns and return uncertainty in the context of liberalization 
policies to assess fresh patterns for the feasibility of common policy initiatives. But for some 
scanty evidence of convergence in return on equity, there is overwhelming absence of catch-
up among sampled countries. Implications for regional integration and portfolio 
diversification have been discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources  
    
Return on Assets  ROA Average Return on Assets (Net Income/Total Assets) FDSD (WB) 
    
Return on Equity  ROE Average Return on Equity (Net Income/Total Equity) FDSD (WB) 
    
Uncertainty in ROA  UROA Uncertainty in Average Return on Assets  Author 
    
Uncertainty in ROE UROE Uncertainty in Average Return on Equity Author 
    
Foreign Direct Investment FDI Net Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) WDI (WB) 
    
Trade Openness  Trade Exports plus Import of Commodities (% of GDP) WDI (WB) 
    
Inflation  Inflation Consumer Price Inflation (Annual %) WDI (WB) 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Exp Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
WDI (WB) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg Gross Domestic Product Growth (Annual %) WDI (WB) 
    
Institutional Index  Instidex First Principal Component of Good Governance 
Indicators: VA, RL, RQ, PolSta, CC, GE 
PCA  
    
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WB: World Bank. WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic 
Product. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. PolSta: Political Stability. CC: Corruption-Control. GE: 
Government Effectiveness. PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (3 year NOI) and presentation of countries  
      
 Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.189 1.655 -2.391 9.452 112 
Return on Equity (ROE) 21.349 14.324 -2.669 63.550 112 
Uncertainty in ROA (UROA) 0.771 1.249 -1.462 11.420 109 
Uncertainty in ROE (UROE) 6.946 6.976 -6.953 38.911 109 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2.842 2.887 -2.751 17.897 99 
Trade Openness (Trade) 70.045 29.429 26.326 175.87 108 
Inflation 7.102 5.843 -1.742 32.362 107 
Government Expenditure  4.242 6.869 -17.387 26.226 82 
Economic Prosperity  4.337 2.445 -2.894 14.755 112 
Institutional Quality (Instidex) 0.078 2.163 -4.028 5.060 108 
      
 Panel B: Presentation of Countries (28) 
      
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia 
      
SD: Standard Deviation. NOI: Non-Overlapping Intervals.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation analysis 
           
ROA ROE UROA UROE FDI Trade Inflation Gov.Exp GDPg Instidex  
1.000 0.847 0.0005 0.265 0.043 0.027 0.367 0.096 0.246 -0.025 ROA 
 1.000 0.094 0.295 0.121 0.017 0.331 0.133 0.231 0108 ROE 
  1.000 0.508 0.048 -0.027 0.137 0.085 0.082 -0.291 UROA 
   1.000 0.107 -0.069 0.101 0.116 0.024 -0.217 UROE 
    1.000 0.432 0.113 0.126 0.152 0.091 FDI 
     1.000 0.077 0.030 -0.151 0.439 Trade 
      1.000 0.146 0.169 0.010 Inflation 
       1.000 0.305 0.034 Gov. Exp 
        1.000 0.114 GDPg 
         1.000 Instidex 
           
ROA: Return on Assets. ROE: Return on Equity. UROA: Uncertainty in ROA. UROE: Uncertainty in ROE. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. 
Trade: Trade Openness. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPg: Gross Domestic Growth rate. Instidex: Institutional Index.  
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